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The Agency Problem, Corporate Governance,
and the Asymmetrical Behavior of Selling, General, and
Administrative Costs*
CLARA XIAOLING CHEN, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
HAI LU, University of Toronto
THEODORE SOUGIANNIS, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1. Introduction
Selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs represent a signiﬁcant proportion of the
costs of business operations. On average, the SG&A costs to total assets ratio is 27 per-
cent, compared to the research and development (R&D) to total assets ratio of 3 percent
(Banker, Huang, and Natarajan 2011). Due to the importance of SG&A costs, practitio-
ners pay close attention to controlling SG&A spending. Understanding SG&A cost behav-
ior and the role of managers in adjusting the costs is thus important to researchers and
practitioners. Recent empirical research indicates that SG&A costs behave asymmetrically,
that is, they increase more rapidly when demand increases than they decline when demand
decreases (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003). This phenomenon (also labeled
‘‘cost stickiness’’) has received much attention in the accounting literature (e.g., Balakrish-
nan and Gruca 2008; Anderson and Lanen 2007; Balakrishnan and Soderstrom 2009;
Banker, Byzalov, and Plehn-Dujowich 2010).
Prior studies have predominantly explained cost stickiness with economic factors such
as asset intensity and uncertainty of future demand and have largely ignored the impact of
managerial incentives on cost behavior. Although Anderson et al. (2003: 49) conjecture
that part of SG&A cost asymmetry may be attributable to agency costs, there is no large-
scale empirical evidence on their conjecture. Drawing on the empire building and the
downsizing literatures, we ﬁll the gap in the cost stickiness literature by examining the fol-
lowing two research questions: (i) Is SG&A cost asymmetry positively associated with the
agency problem, after controlling for known economic determinants of this asymmetry?
(ii) Does strong corporate governance mitigate any positive association between the agency
problem and SG&A cost asymmetry?
Agency theory predicts that the misalignment of interests between shareholders and
managers could lead to agency problems, that is, managers engage in activities for their
own beneﬁts rather than the beneﬁts of the ﬁrm’s shareholders (Jensen and Meckling
1976). A well-documented agency problem is managerial ‘‘empire building’’, which refers
to managers’ tendencies to grow the ﬁrm beyond its optimal size or to maintain unutilized
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resources with the purpose of increasing personal utility from status, power, compensation,
and prestige (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990; Masulis, Wang, and Xie 2007; Hope and Thomas
2008). For example, in his seminal paper on managers’ utility-maximizing tendencies, Wil-
liamson (1963) speciﬁcally uses the expansion of staff (proxied by SG&A costs) beyond
optimal levels as an example to illustrate the effects of managerial discretion on managers’
opportunistic behavior.1 Despite the relevance of SG&A costs to the empire building liter-
ature, empirical work in this literature has focused on more salient, infrequent activities
such as mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Titman, Wei, and Xie 2004; Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith 2007; Masulis et al. 2007) while ignoring less salient, ongoing activities such as
SG&A expenditures. Because SG&A costs capture most of the overhead costs incurred in
the corporate ofﬁces (such as salespersons’ salaries and commissions, ofﬁce payroll and
expenses, travel and entertainment), empire building managers are likely to increase
SG&A costs too rapidly (e.g., adding ofﬁce payroll and expenses too quickly) when sales
go up or to decrease SG&A costs too slowly (e.g., delaying the reduction of ofﬁce payroll
and expenses) when sales go down. Such behavior will shift SG&A cost asymmetry away
from its optimal level and result in greater SG&A cost asymmetry than dictated by eco-
nomic factors. This implies a positive relation between the agency problem and the degree
of SG&A cost asymmetry, that is, the stronger the empire building incentives, the greater
the SG&A cost asymmetry and thus the larger the shift of SG&A costs from their optimal
levels.2
Moreover, the economics and management literatures have also drawn on agency the-
ory to posit that managers have disincentives to downsize because: (i) managers derive
monetary and nonmonetary beneﬁts from managing larger and more complex organiza-
tions, (ii) any beneﬁts from downsizing accrue primarily to shareholders rather than man-
agers, and (iii) managers may prefer the quiet life and try to avoid the difﬁcult decisions
and costly efforts associated with downsizing (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; see Datta,
Guthrie, Basuil, and Pandey 2010 for a review). While the downsizing literature does not
focus exclusively on SG&A costs, it examines factors that underpin SG&A costs, for
example, head counts in corporate ofﬁces. In particular, this literature suggests that many
downsizings target management and white-collar staff rather than the ﬁrm’s productive
core because slack resources are most likely to be found in the former. Researchers in the
downsizing literature have used SG&A costs as the primary proxy for slack resources
channeled into overhead and staff expenses (e.g., Bourgeois 1981; Singh 1986; Wiseman
and Bromiley 1996). To the extent that SG&A costs capture a large portion of the organi-
zational slack that managers should otherwise cut in response to demand declines
(e.g., ofﬁce payroll and expenses), managers’ disincentives to downsize will result in greater
SG&A cost asymmetry. Therefore, drawing on the empire building and the downsizing
literatures, we predict that the agency problem shifts SG&A cost asymmetry from its
1. ‘‘Expansion of staff is an activity that offers positive rewards, the beneﬁts of which can be enjoyed quite
generally. Indeed, since promotional opportunities within a ﬁxed-size ﬁrm are limited, while increased
jurisdiction has the same general effect as promotion but simultaneously produces the chance of advance
for all, the incentive to expand staff may be difﬁcult to resist. Not only is it an indirect means to the
attainment of salary, but it is a source of security, power, status, prestige, and professional achievement as
well’’ (Williamson 1963: 1034).
2. Anecdotal evidence also supports the tendency of managers to overspend on SG&A costs without legiti-
mate economic reasons (Lazere 1997; White and Dieckman 2005; Wilson 2000). For example, White and
Dieckman (2005: 23) ﬁnd no correlation between hypothesized SG&A drivers (e.g., business and product
complexity, geographic footprint, number of products, business size, and channel strategy) and actual
SG&A spending, but instead ﬁnd a strong positive correlation between gross margin and SG&A spending,
suggesting that ‘‘companies appear to spend more if they have more to spend’’.
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optimal level, resulting in a positive association between the agency problem and SG&A
cost asymmetry after controlling for legitimate economic reasons.
Our second research question examines the role of corporate governance in mitigating
the effect of the agency problem on SG&A cost asymmetry. Corporate governance is
expected to alleviate the agency problem and restrain managers’ incentives to further their
own interests at the expense of the shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). If retaining
SG&A costs is not dictated by economic circumstances, effective monitoring should dis-
courage managers from increasing SG&A costs excessively in response to demand
increases and encourage managers to eliminate slack in SG&A costs in response to
demand decreases. Both the empire building and the downsizing literatures provide empiri-
cal evidence consistent with the monitoring role of corporate governance. For example,
the empire building literature suggests that takeover threats reduce managers’ empire
building behavior through overspending in capital expenditure (Titman et al. 2004) or
acquisitions (Masulis et al. 2007). In the downsizing literature, it has been argued that
managers are more likely to downsize in response to performance declines in the presence
of a more independent board (Perry and Shivdasani 2005), a larger percentage of institu-
tional shareholders (Bethel and Liebeskind 1993), or an effective external control market
(Denis and Shome 2005). These ﬁndings have implications for our setting. Speciﬁcally, we
expect strong corporate governance to help bring the degree of SG&A cost asymmetry clo-
ser to the optimal level. Therefore, we hypothesize that the adverse effects of the agency
problem on SG&A cost stickiness should be less pronounced under strong corporate
governance.
To test our predictions, we analyze ﬁnancial and governance data over the period
1996–2005 for ﬁrms in the S&P 1500 index. We use four variables to capture managers’
empire building incentives arising from the agency problem: free cash ﬂow (FCF), chief
executive ofﬁcer (CEO) horizon, tenure, and compensation structure. Consistent with our
ﬁrst prediction, we ﬁnd that cost asymmetry increases with managers’ empire building
incentives due to the agency problem, after controlling for known economic determinants
of cost asymmetry. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that cost asymmetry increases with free cash ﬂow.3
We also ﬁnd that cost asymmetry decreases in years of CEO change or immediately
preceding a CEO change, and that cost asymmetry increases with CEO tenure and the
percentage of at-risk pay in the CEO’s total compensation. These results provide strong
support for our argument that the agency problem complements legitimate economic
factors in explaining cross-sectional variations in SG&A cost asymmetry.
To address our second research question, we construct two corporate governance
factors out of six key corporate governance variables and use these factors to split our
sample into two subsamples based on the strength of corporate governance (above and
below median factor score using each factor). As predicted, we ﬁnd that the positive
association between the agency problem and SG&A cost asymmetry becomes less
pronounced in the strong governance subsamples compared with the weak governance
subsamples, suggesting that strong corporate governance mitigates the effects of the
agency problem on SG&A cost asymmetry.
We conduct additional analyses to provide more direct evidence on whether the
agency problem shifts SG&A cost asymmetry from its optimal level. To the extent that
some SG&A costs create long-term value (Anderson, Banker, Huang, and Janakiraman
2007; Banker et al. 2011), a certain level of SG&A cost asymmetry may be desirable.
Building on the Banker et al. 2011 results on the long-term value created by SG&A expen-
ditures, we predict that in ﬁrms where SG&A costs create lower future value, SG&A cost
stickiness should be inﬂuenced more by agency factors than by economic considerations.
3. This result is robust after we control for the endogeneity of free cash ﬂow.
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We partition our sample based on the long-term value creation potential (high vs. low) of
SG&A costs and compare the coefﬁcients on the agency-related variables across the two
subsamples. We ﬁnd a lower degree of cost stickiness when SG&A costs have low value-
creation potential than when SG&A costs have high value-creation potential. However, we
also ﬁnd that, as predicted, the agency problem inﬂuences cost stickiness to a greater
extent in ﬁrms where SG&A costs create lower long-term value compared to ﬁrms where
SG&A costs create higher long-term value. Consistent with the suboptimal level of cost
stickiness, we ﬁnd that return on equity (ROE) in year t + 1 is signiﬁcantly lower for the
Low Value Creation subsample than for the High Value Creation subsample, even though
ROEs in years t)1 and t are not signiﬁcantly different between the two subsamples. These
results provide further evidence that the agency problem shifts cost asymmetry from its
optimal level.
Finally, the empire building and downsizing arguments should be more applicable to
mature, stable ﬁrms than to young, growth ﬁrms because mature ﬁrms tend to have more
slack resources channeled into SG&A costs (Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, and Tansik 1988).
We partition our sample based on the life cycle stage of each ﬁrm-year and compare the
coefﬁcients on the agency-related variables across the two subsamples. Consistent with our
prediction, we ﬁnd that the agency problem affects cost stickiness to a greater extent in
mature ﬁrms than in growth ﬁrms.
Collectively, our ﬁndings suggest that the agency problem provides an important
explanation for SG&A cost asymmetry, particularly among those ﬁrms with weak corpo-
rate governance, ﬁrms in which SG&A costs create low future value, and mature ﬁrms.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, prior studies on cost stick-
iness have largely ignored the impact of managerial incentives. We ﬁll the gap in the
cost stickiness literature by showing that, in addition to economic factors, agency factors
also motivate managers’ cost adjustment decisions and thus help explain SG&A cost
behavior. More importantly, we provide evidence that the agency problem shifts SG&A
cost stickiness away from its optimal level. Second, we contribute to the FCF literature
by documenting a strong positive association between free cash ﬂow and SG&A cost
asymmetry. Although SG&A costs capture most of the slack resources channeled into
overhead and staff expenses and thus represent an important aspect of managerial
empire building, previous studies on FCF and empire building behavior have focused on
more salient, infrequent activities such as mergers and acquisitions or capital expendi-
tures. We complement those studies by showing that the empire building problem can
also be manifested in SG&A cost behavior. Third, our study adds to a stream of empiri-
cal studies that examine the effectiveness of corporate governance in mitigating the
agency problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. In section 2, we develop
our hypotheses. In section 3, we discuss the sample and measures used in the analyses.
Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 concludes.
2. Hypotheses development
SG&A cost asymmetry and the agency problem
As discussed in the introduction, prior studies on SG&A cost asymmetry have largely
ignored the impact of the agency problem on cost behavior. We draw on the empire build-
ing and the downsizing literatures to predict a positive association between the agency
problem and SG&A cost asymmetry. In the following subsections, we develop hypotheses
for speciﬁc measures of the agency problem. We follow the literature in accounting and
corporate ﬁnance and use FCF, CEO tenure, CEO horizon, and CEO compensation to
proxy for managers’ empire building incentives due to the agency problem.
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FCF
FCF is a commonly used proxy for the agency problem and the resulting empire building
incentives (Jensen 1986; Masulis et al. 2007; Richardson 2006; Stulz 1990; Shleifer and
Vishny 1997; Titman et al. 2004). Deﬁned as cash in excess of that required to fund all
available positive NPV projects, FCF arises when there is a mismatch between available
cash and growth prospects (Jensen 1986). The FCF hypothesis proposed by Jensen 1986
suggests that managers with high levels of FCF are likely to invest it in operations or neg-
ative net present value projects instead of paying it out to shareholders in order to increase
perquisites consumption. Much empirical evidence supports Jensen’s FCF hypothesis. For
example, Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1991) examine a sample of successful tender offers
and ﬁnd a negative relationship between FCF and bidder returns. Gibbs (1993) ﬁnds that
ﬁnancial and portfolio restructurings are inﬂuenced by the agency costs of FCF. Recently,
Richardson (2006) ﬁnds systematic evidence for the overinvestment of FCF. Applying the
insights from these studies to managers’ SG&A decisions, we predict that when FCF is
high, managers have greater opportunity for overinvesting in operational costs such as
SG&A in response to an increase in output demand and delaying the cutting of SG&A
costs in response to a decrease in output demand, leading to greater SG&A cost asym-
metry. By contrast, when FCF is low, managers have less opportunity for empire build-
ing and they are more likely to reduce SG&A costs in response to demand decreases in
order to avoid negative career consequences. The above discussion leads to our ﬁrst
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a. The degree of SG&A cost asymmetry is positively associated with a ﬁrm’s
FCF after controlling for known economic determinants of the asymmetry.
CEO tenure
Another factor that inﬂuences managers’ empire building incentives is CEO tenure. CEOs
with long tenures are more likely to be entrenched in their positions because they have
had more time to build coalitions and accumulate power. As a result, they tend to have
more control over the board and other internal monitoring mechanisms and are more
likely to pursue their own interests rather than the shareholders’ interests. For example,
Hill and Phan (1991) ﬁnd that the relationship between ﬁrm size and pay strengthens as
CEO tenure increases, suggesting that longer-tenure CEOs have more power to structure
their compensation packages to enhance their own interests. Berger, Ofek, and Yermack
(1997) use CEO tenure as a proxy for managerial entrenchment and ﬁnd evidence that
after controlling for nonagency determinants of leverage, ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly lower
leverage when the CEOs are more entrenched. In general, managers are motivated to
empire build in the hope of increasing their prestige and compensation through the
increase in ﬁrm size. Therefore, CEOs with longer tenures should have greater empire
building incentives because they are more likely to enjoy higher compensation when ﬁrm
size increases. Thus, we predict that as tenure increases, managerial empire building incen-
tives increase, which, in turn, leads to greater SG&A cost asymmetry.
HYPOTHESIS 1b. The degree of SG&A cost asymmetry is positively associated with CEO
tenure, after controlling for known economic determinants of the asymmetry.
CEO horizon
Managers are motivated to empire build because they expect to obtain greater prestige
and higher compensation if they increase ﬁrm size (Murphy 1985; Jensen and Murphy
256 Contemporary Accounting Research
CAR Vol. 29 No. 1 (Spring 2012)
1990; Rose and Shepard 1997). Because the expected cumulative beneﬁts such as prestige
and compensation increase with a manager’s horizon (i.e., the number of years the man-
ager expects to remain in ofﬁce), a manager’s empire building incentives should increase
with horizon. For managers who approach retirement or expect to leave their ﬁrms within
a short period of time, the expected beneﬁts from empire building will accrue to their suc-
cessors rather than to themselves, which should reduce their empire building incentives.
Consistent with this, Dechow and Sloan (1991) ﬁnd that CEOs spend less on R&D expen-
ditures during their ﬁnal years in ofﬁce. Therefore, we expect CEOs who are in their ﬁnal
years of service (i.e., face a short horizon) to be less likely to empire build and more likely
to cut SG&A costs when necessary, leading to a lower degree of cost asymmetry. The
above discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1c. The degree of SG&A cost asymmetry is positively associated with CEO hori-
zon (i.e., cost asymmetry decreases in the year of or in the year immediately preceding
CEO change), after controlling for known economic determinants of the asymmetry.
CEO compensation
The structure of managers’ compensation schemes also affects their empire building incen-
tives. There are mixed arguments and empirical evidence on the effects of CEO compensa-
tion schemes. Some studies ﬁnd that more variable pay leads to greater alignment of
incentives and triggers lower incentives to empire build, but other studies ﬁnd that variable
pay may be a way managers extract rent from the company (see Hanlon, Rajgopal, and
Shevlin 2003 for a discussion of the debate). In our paper, we focus speciﬁcally on the effect
of CEO compensation on managers’ empire building behavior, which likely differs from
other types of behavior driven by agency costs. We draw on Kanniainen’s 2000 analytical
work that speciﬁcally examines the effect of executive compensation structure on empire
building. Kanniainen (2000) ﬁnds that, under assumptions of decreasing absolute risk aver-
sion and decreasing preference for prudence, a manager’s empire building incentives are
attenuated when his ⁄her compensation is hedged by a ﬁxed income. As the proportion of
ﬁxed income in a manager’s total compensation package decreases, the manager has greater
incentives to overinvest under uncertainty because an increase in investment provides man-
agers with an instrument for a precautionary strategy: ‘‘By investing, the management saves
inside the ﬁrm, creating resources to be consumed as private beneﬁts’’ (Kanniainen 2000:
133). Kanniainen’s results suggest that the commonly observed incentive contracts actually
create greater incentives for empire building. Drawing on Kanniainen’s insights, we predict
that when the percentage of at-risk (nonﬁxed) pay in CEO compensation packages
increases, CEOs should have greater empire building incentives, leading to greater cost
asymmetry. Conversely, the percentage of ﬁxed compensation in CEOs’ total compensation
should be negatively associated with cost asymmetry. Consistent with Kanniainen’s argu-
ment, Banker et al. (2011) ﬁnd that cash pay is negatively related to change in SG&A costs
because ﬁrms use cash-based compensation to penalize wasteful spending on SG&A costs.
Drawing on Kanniainen 2000 and Banker et al. 2011, we posit the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1d. The degree of SG&A cost asymmetry is negatively associated with the
percentage of ﬁxed pay in a CEO’s total compensation, after controlling for known
economic determinants of the asymmetry.
The role of corporate governance in reducing the agency problem
Our second research question investigates the role of corporate governance in reducing
the agency problem in SG&A cost behavior. Strong corporate governance can mitigate
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the agency problem and restrain managers’ incentives to further their own interests
at the expense of the shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Prior research has exam-
ined the impact of a variety of corporate governance mechanisms on ﬁrm performance
and managerial decision making (see Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna 2007 for a review).
In particular, empirical evidence supports the effectiveness of corporate governance
mechanisms in reducing the agency problem manifested in managers’ empire building
behavior or unwillingness to downsize. For example, Titman et al. (2004) ﬁnd a negative
association between capital expenditures and subsequent returns, consistent with manag-
ers’ empire building behavior. However, they ﬁnd that such behavior did not exist in
time periods when hostile takeovers were more prevalent. Masulis et al. (2007) ﬁnd that
managers protected by more anti-takeover provisions are more likely to indulge in
value-destroying acquisitions. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) ﬁnd that being account-
able to long-term shareholders reduces the leeway the managers of the bidder have to
engage in questionable acquisitions that are made to enhance private beneﬁts of the
managers. Richardson (2006) ﬁnds that the presence of activist shareholders mitigates
overinvestment of FCF. Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with greater block-
holder ownership experience higher levels of employee reductions. The downsizing litera-
ture also suggests that ﬁrms with independent boards are more likely to engage in
downsizing (Perry and Shivdasani 2005). Building on the ﬁndings from prior studies, we
expect strong corporate governance mechanisms to discourage managers from increasing
SG&A costs excessively in response to demand increases and to encourage managers to
eliminate slack in SG&A costs in response to demand decreases. This leads to our sec-
ond hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2. The association between the agency problem and the degree of SG&A cost
asymmetry is weaker in ﬁrms with stronger corporate governance.
3. Sample and variable measurement
Sample selection
We obtain data on SG&A costs, sales revenue, and other ﬁnancial variables from the
COMPUSTAT annual industrial ﬁles. We obtain the corporate governance variables
from ExecuComp (CEO ⁄Chairman separation), RiskMetrics (board size, percentage of
independent board members, anti-takeover provisions), and Thomson Financial (per-
centage of institutional ownership). The RiskMetrics and ExecuComp databases cover
S&P 1500 ﬁrms, which come from a broad range of representative industries, thus alle-
viating potential concerns about industry clustering. Because the RiskMetrics data start
from 1996, our sample covers the period 1996–2005.4 The director data are based on
board information released after the annual directors’ meeting following the corre-
sponding ﬁscal year. We construct two samples: a base sample and a testing sample.
The base sample does not include the agency variables and we use it to compare our
results with those reported by Anderson et al. 2003. The testing sample, which is the
intersection between the base sample and the agency variables, is used to test our
hypotheses.
Table 1 illustrates our sample selection procedures, which closely follow those
discussed in Anderson et al. 2003 and Anderson and Lanen 2007. We start with 244,178
ﬁrm-year observations in the COMPUSTAT annual industrial ﬁles for ﬁscal years
1995–2005. We require sales and SG&A costs to be available in the current year and the
4. To construct ﬁnancial variables with lagged values, we use data for the ﬁscal year 1995 in COMPUSTAT
and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
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TABLE 1
Sample selection procedures
Base Sample:
Number
of obs. Testing Sample:
Number
of obs.
(1) Unique observations
in COMPUSTAT
annual industrial
database over ﬁscal
years 1995 to 2005
244,178 (1) Unique observations
in COMPUSTAT
annual industrial
database over ﬁscal
years 1995 to 2005
244,178
(2) Drop observations
with missing data on
SG&A costs and sales
revenue for the current
year and the previous
year and observations
for which sales revenue
is smaller than SG&A costs
67,213 (2) Drop observations
with missing data on
SG&A costs and sales
revenue for the current
year and the previous
year and observations
for which sales revenue
is smaller than SG&A costs
67,213
(3) Trim top and bottom
0.5 percent of observations
with extreme values in
the change of SG&A costs
and the change of sales
revenue
66,632 (3) Merge the COMPUSTAT
data with variables
from ExecuComp,
RiskMetrics, and
Thomson Financial
10,167
(4) Drop observations
with missing data on
economic variables
and exclude observations
where sales and SG&A costs
move in the opposite
directions.
51,314 (4) Trim top and bottom
0.5 percent of the
observations with
extreme values in the
change of SG&A costs
and the change of sales
revenue
10,012
(5) Drop observations
with missing data on
corporate governance,
economic, and
management incentive
variables
6,418
(6) Exclude observations
where sales and SG&A
costs move in the
opposite directions.
5,278
Note:
We extract relevant data from COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp, RiskMetrics, and Thomson Financial
databases over the period 1995–2005. The base sample is used to compare our results with
those reported in Anderson et al. 2003. The testing sample is used to test our hypotheses. The
RiskMetrics and ExecuComp databases cover S&P 1500 ﬁrms (active and inactive). SG&A and
sales revenue are COMPUSTAT items 189 and 12, respectively.
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previous year in the sample period, and we also require SG&A costs to be smaller than
sales. These criteria result in a sample of 67,213 ﬁrm-year observations. Next, we trim the
top and the bottom 0.5 percent of the observations with extreme values in the change of
SG&A costs and change of sales revenue, resulting in 66,632 observations. Finally, we fol-
low Anderson and Lanen’s 2007 suggestion and exclude observations where SG&A costs
move in the opposite direction of sales (i.e., SG&A increases following sales declines
or SG&A decreases following sales increases).5 This results in a base sample of 51,314
observations.
We obtain our testing sample by combining the COMPUSTAT variables (before the
trimming) with variables from ExecuComp and Thomson Financial. The merging of these
databases yields 10,167 observations. We then trim the top and the bottom 0.5 percent of
the observations with extreme values in SG&A changes and sales changes. This results in
10,012 observations. Next, we drop observations with missing data on agency, economic,
and corporate governance variables, resulting in a sample of 6,418 observations. Finally,
we follow Anderson and Lanen’s 2007 suggestion and exclude observations where SG&A
costs move in the opposite direction of sales and obtain a ﬁnal testing sample of 5,278
ﬁrm-year observations.
Agency variables
We use four variables to capture managers’ empire building incentives due to the agency
problem: FCF, CEO Tenure, CEO Horizon, and CEO Fixed Pay. FCF is measured as cash
ﬂow from operating activities (data item 308) minus common and preferred dividends
(data items 21 and 19) scaled by total assets (data item 6) (Lang et al. 1991; Core and
Guay 1999). CEO Tenure is the number of years that the CEO has been in ofﬁce. CEO
Horizon is an indicator variable that is deﬁned as one if it is a year of CEO change or a
year immediately preceding a CEO change and zero otherwise. CEO Fixed Pay is the ratio
of salary plus bonus divided by total compensation during year t, where total compensa-
tion consists of salary, bonus, value of restricted stocks and options, and all other annual
payouts. Following prior literature (e.g., Jensen and Murphy 1990), we use salary and
bonus to proxy for ﬁxed pay because both have extremely low sensitivity to changes in
ﬁrm value.
Economic variables
We control for known economic determinants of SG&A cost asymmetry in our tests.
First, we control for employee intensity and asset intensity (Anderson et al. 2003).
Employee Intensity is calculated as the ratio of the total number of employees to sales rev-
enue, and Asset Intensity is calculated as the ratio of total assets to sales revenue. Second,
we control for successive revenue decreases because managers are more likely to consider
a negative demand shock to be permanent when there are revenue decreases in two consec-
utive years. Successive Decrease is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if sales
revenues in year t)1 are less than those in year t)2 and zero otherwise. We also control
for Stock Performance, measured by the raw stock returns in the year prior to the annual
board meeting. The relation between stock performance and cost asymmetry is ambiguous.
Firms with good stock performance may be more efﬁcient in cutting unutilized resources,
resulting in a negative relation between stock performance and cost asymmetry. However,
good stock performance may signal positive expectations about the ﬁrm’s future earnings,
5. Anderson and Lanen (2007) argue that cost stickiness is conditional on the assumption that costs move in
the same direction as activities (b1 > 0). In our raw sample, SG&A costs for about 8 percent of the obser-
vations in our entire sample decrease following a sales increase, while SG&A costs for about 9 percent of
the observations in our entire sample increase following a sales decrease.
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which may lead managers to deliberately retain some unnecessary SG&A costs, resulting
in a greater degree of cost asymmetry. Therefore, we do not make a directional prediction
about the relationship between the ﬁrm’s stock market performance and the magnitude of
cost asymmetry.
Corporate governance variables
We examine six well-documented governance variables. We brieﬂy discuss each of these
governance variables below.
Board size
Larger boards beneﬁt a company by increasing the pool of expertise and resources avail-
able to ﬁrm management (Lorsch and Maclver 1989; Goodstein, Gautam, and Boeker
1994), but potentially suffer from greater social loaﬁng and more difﬁcult coordination
among board members (Jensen 1993). Some studies ﬁnd that ﬁrms with larger boards per-
form better (e.g., Adams and Mehran 2005), but the majority of prior studies ﬁnd evidence
favoring smaller boards (e.g., Yermack 1996). Thus, we expect board size to decrease cor-
porate governance quality. Board Size is measured as the total number of directors on the
board.
Board independence
Boards that are more independent are expected to have incentives better aligned with those
of the shareholders. Prior literature has shown that board independence is positively asso-
ciated with ﬁrm value (e.g., Weisbach 1988; Byrd and Hickman 1992; Brickley, Coles, and
Terry 1994; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999) and
negatively associated with ﬁnancial fraud and earnings management (e.g., Beasley 1996;
Dechow et al. 1996; Klein 2002). We measure Board Independence with two variables: (i)
The Percentage of Independent Directors, which is calculated as the number of outside
directors divided by the total number of directors and (ii) CEO ⁄Chairman Separation, an
indicator variable that is equal to one if the CEO and the chairman of the board are not
the same person and zero otherwise.
Institutional shareholders
Prior research has generally shown that institutional shareholders are better and more
active monitors of managerial behavior than individual investors (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny
1986; Bushee 1998; Atiase, Mayew, and Xue 2006). We measure Percentage Institutional
Ownership as the number of shares held by institutional investors divided by the
total shares outstanding at the end of the quarter closest to the date of the annual board
meeting.
Anti-takeover provisions
Both the empire building and the downsizing literatures document the role of the market
for corporate control in reducing the agency problem and encouraging managers to take
actions that increase the efﬁciency of the ﬁrm. By substantially delaying the process and
making a hostile acquisition more difﬁcult, anti-takeover provisions decrease the probabil-
ity of a successful takeover and hence undermine the ability of the market for corporate
control to motivate managers to maximize current shareholder wealth. Prior studies
provide ample empirical evidence supporting this argument (e.g., Titman et al. 2004;
Masulis et al. 2007; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007). Following prior studies, we measure
Anti-takeover Provisions with two proxies: (i) BCF Anti-takeover Index, which is created
based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, limits
to shareholder charter amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, poison pills,
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and golden parachutes (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009) and (ii) Staggered Board,
which is an indicator variable that captures whether the board is staggered (coded as one)
or unitary (coded as zero).6 Because anti-takeover provisions undermine the monitoring
role of an external control market, corporate governance quality is a decreasing function
of both of these anti-takeover measures.
The prior literature on corporate governance suggests that different corporate gover-
nance mechanisms work simultaneously, so we conduct principal component analysis to
reduce the dimensionality of our governance variables. We present details on this in
section 4 below.
4. Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on annual revenues and SG&A costs for
our testing sample. On average, our sample ﬁrms have $5,383 million in annual sales reve-
nue (median = $1,433 million) and $1,029 million in SG&A costs (median = $276 mil-
lion). The mean value of SG&A costs as a percentage of sales revenue is 23.79 percent
(median = 21.34 percent). These statistics are comparable to those reported in Anderson
et al. 2003. Panel B of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the economic variables.
On average, the sample ﬁrms use 6.21 (median = 4.86) employees and $1.13 million
(mean = 0.93) of assets to support each million dollars in sales revenue. The median ﬁrm
has not experienced two consecutive years of sales decreases in the past two years (med-
ian = 0, mean = 0.23), and the average raw stock return in the year prior to the annual
board meeting is 0.19 (median = 0.12).
Panel C of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the agency variables. On average,
free cash ﬂow accounts for 10 percent of total assets (median = 9 percent) for our sample
ﬁrms. The average CEO in our sample ﬁrms has been in ofﬁce for 7.25 years (med-
ian = 5). Only 17 percent of our observations come from years of CEO changes or imme-
diately preceding CEO changes. On average, salary and bonus account for 49 percent of
total CEO compensation in our sample (median = 44 percent). Panel D of Table 2 pro-
vides descriptive statistics on the corporate governance variables. The median board in our
sample has 9 members, and the majority of the boards do not have separate chairmen and
CEOs (CEO ⁄Chairman Separation median = 0, mean = 0.37). On average, 65.65 percent
of the board members are outsiders (% independent directors, median = 66.67 percent).
The average percentage of institutional ownership is 65.53 percent (median = 67.52 per-
cent). The average BCF Anti-takeover Index is 1.59 (median = 2), indicating that the
average ﬁrm has one to two anti-takeover provisions. The majority of ﬁrms in our testing
sample have staggered boards (median = 1, mean = 0.61). These statistics are compara-
ble to those documented in the prior literature (e.g., Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Core
et al. 1999; Larcker et al. 2007).
Table 3 provides Spearman and Pearson correlations between our main variables.
The majority of the correlations are signiﬁcant but small in magnitude. For all the
models that we estimate, we conduct multicollinearity diagnostic tests for all the inde-
pendent variables in the models, including the interaction terms with demeaned continu-
ous variables (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980; Greene 2003). We ﬁnd that the tolerance,
deﬁned as the inverse of variance inﬂation factor (1 ⁄VIF), is higher than 0.1 for all the
variables, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern in the estimation of our
models.
6. In ﬁrms with staggered boards, directors are categorized into classes. Only one class of directors stands
for election at the shareholders’ annual meeting. Typically, a staggered board has three classes of directors,
so a rival team has to win two elections to gain control of the ﬁrm (Bebchuk and Cohen 2005).
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TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Std Dev
Panel A: Revenue and SG&A costs
Sales Revenue ($mil) 5,383 1,433 15,562
SG&A Costs ($mil) 1,029 276 2,628
SG&A as % of Revenue 23.79 21.34 14.93
Panel B: Economic variables
Employee Intensity 6.21 4.86 7.46
Asset Intensity 1.13 0.93 0.85
Successive Decrease (indicator) 0.23 0 0.42
Stock Performance 0.19 0.12 0.62
Panel C: Agency variables
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 0.10 0.09 0.08
Tenure 7.25 5 7.90
Horizon 0.17 0 0.37
FixedPay 0.49 0.44 0.28
Panel D: Governance variables
Board Size 9.15 9.00 2.52
CEO ⁄Chairman Separation 0.37 0 0.48
% Independent Directors 65.65 66.67 18.02
% Institutional Ownership 65.53 67.52 17.98
BCF Anti-takeover Index 1.59 2 1.06
Staggered Board 0.61 1 0.49
Note:
This table presents the descriptive statistics for testing sample. Panel A describes the distribution of sales
revenue and SG&A costs for the ﬁrms in the base and testing samples. Sales Revenue and SG&A
Costs are total sales revenue and selling, general, and administration expenses reported in
COMPUSTAT annual database (data items 12 and 189, respectively). Panels B, C, and D present the
descriptive statistics of economic, agency, and governance variables, respectively: Employee Intensity
is the number of employees divided by total sales revenue; Asset Intensity is total assets (data item
6) divided by sales revenue; Successive Decrease is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if revenue
in year t)1 is less than revenue in t)2, and 0 otherwise; Stock Performance is the raw stock return
(from CRSP) in the year prior to the annual board meeting; Free Cash Flow (FCF) is measured as
cash ﬂow from operating activities (data item 308) – Common and preferred dividends (data items
21 and 19) scaled by total assets (data item 6); Tenure is the number of years that the CEO has been
in ofﬁce; Horizon is an indicator variable, deﬁned as 1 if it is the year of CEO change or the year
immediately preceding CEO change, 0 otherwise; FixedPay is the ratio of salary plus bonus divided
by total compensation during the year; Board Size is the total number of members on the board of
directors; CEO ⁄Chairman Separation is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO and the
chairman of the board are not the same person, and 0 otherwise; %Independent Directors is the
percentage of independent (outside) directors on the board; %Institutional Ownership is the number
of shares held by institutional investors divided by the total shares outstanding at the end of the
quarter closest to the date of the annual board meeting; BCF Anti-takeover Index is created based
on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, limits to shareholder
charter amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, poison pills, and golden parachutes;
Staggered Board is an indicator variable indicating whether the board is staggered (1) or unitary (0).
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Documentation of cost asymmetry
We estimate the following regression to replicate the SG&A cost asymmetry phenomenon
documented in previous studies:
logð SG & Ai;t
SG & Ai;t1
Þ ¼ b0 þ b1logð
Salesi;t
Salesi;t1
Þ þ b2DecDummy  logð
Salesi;t
Salesi;t1
Þ
þ
X6
m¼3
bmDecDummy  logð
Salesi;t
Salesi;t1
Þ  EconVarm;i;t þ
X10
s¼7
EconVars;i;t þ ei;t ð1Þ
where SG&Ai,t and Salesi,t are selling, general, and administrative costs (COMPUSTAT
data item 189) and sales revenue (COMPUSTAT data item 12), respectively, for ﬁrm i at
year t. DecDummy takes the value of one when sales revenues in year t are less than those in
year t)1 and zero otherwise. Coefﬁcient b1 measures the percentage increase in SG&A costs
with a 1 percent increase in sales revenue. EconVar stands for the four economic determi-
nants as control variables: Employee Intensity, Asset Intensity, Successive Performance, and
Stock Performance (deﬁned in section 3 above). Continuous variables used in the interaction
terms are mean-centered before they are included in the analysis to mitigate multicollineari-
ty as well as to facilitate the interpretation of the main effects (Aiken and West 1991).
Because the value of DecDummy is one when revenue decreases, the sum of the coefﬁ-
cients (b1 + b2) measures the percentage decrease in SG&A costs with a 1 percent decrease
in sales revenue. A signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient ß1 and a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient
TABLE 3
Correlation matrix
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11
V1: SalesRatio )0.037 0.001 )0.196 0.264 0.057 )0.038 0.062 )0.016 )0.085 0.043
V2: Employee
Intensity
)0.099 )0.083 0.004 0.007 0.055 0.011 0.063 0.051 0.004 )0.037
V3: Asset
Intensity
0.015 )0.123 0.081 )0.001 )0.065 )0.023 )0.011 )0.154 )0.074 0.063
V4: Successive
Decrease
)0.238 0.009 0.110 )0.079 )0.117 0.021 )0.056 0.026 0.032 0.002
V5: Stock
Performance
0.328 )0.052 )0.067 )0.122 0.106 )0.031 0.029 )0.035 )0.044 0.018
V6: Free Cash
Flow
0.086 0.022 )0.077 )0.123 0.153 )0.025 0.010 )0.065 )0.108 0.056
V7: Horizon )0.054 0.034 )0.028 0.021 )0.050 )0.027 0.060 0.042 0.031 )0.018
V8: Tenure 0.124 0.060 )0.037 )0.082 0.049 0.017 0.086 0.171 )0.082 )0.032
V9: FixedPay )0.029 0.148 )0.195 0.027 )0.009 )0.070 0.036 0.126 )0.025 )0.187
V10: Governance
Factor 1
)0.104 )0.013 )0.081 0.033 )0.020 )0.105 0.031 )0.084 )0.011 0
V11: Governance
Factor2
0.031 )0.120 0.101 0.011 0.054 0.040 )0.018 0.026 )0.172 )0.018
Note:
This table presents pooled Spearman and Pearson correlations between the variables. SalesRatio is
the logarithm of the ratio of sales revenue of year t to that of year t)1. The two corporate
governance factors are explained in panel A of Table 6. Other variables are deﬁned in Table 2.
Pearson (Spearman) correlations are presented in the upper (lower) diagonal.
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ß2 would be consistent with cost asymmetry. We estimate the asymmetrical adjustment of
SG&A costs at the ﬁrm level with (1) based on ﬁrm-clustered standard errors (Petersen
2009). We include year dummies in all regression models. To support cost asymmetry, ß1 in
(1) needs to be signiﬁcantly positive and ß2 needs to be signiﬁcantly negative. The results
are shown in Table 4. The estimated value of ß1 is 0.746 (t = 118.48) for the base sample
and 0.772 (t = 38.56) for the testing sample. This indicates that SG&A costs increase by
about 0.75 percent (0.77 percent for the testing sample) per 1 percent increase in sales reve-
nue. The estimated value of ß2 is )0.044 (t = )2.92) for the base sample and )0.082
(t = )1.79) for the testing sample. The combined value of ß1 + ß2 = 0.70 (0.69 for the
testing sample) indicates that SG&A costs decrease by about 0.70 percent (0.69 percent for
the testing sample) per 1 percent decrease in sales revenue. These results indicate that
SG&A cost asymmetry is robust in both the base and testing samples.
The coefﬁcients on the economic variable interaction terms are largely consistent with
the prior literature. The signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on Asset Intensity ()0.055 and
)0.154 for the base sample and testing sample, respectively) suggests a greater degree
of SG&A cost asymmetry in ﬁrms that require relatively more assets to support their
TABLE 4
Regressing annual changes in SG&A costs on annual changes in sales revenue for the sample period
1996–2005
Pred. sign
Base Sample Testing Sample
Coefﬁcient t-stat Coefﬁcient t-stat
Intercept 0.042 21.75*** 0.019 4.05***
Sales Change + 0.746 118.48*** 0.772 38.56***
DecDummy*Sales Change ) )0.044 )2.92*** )0.082 )1.79**
Interaction Terms: (Variable*DecDummy*Sales Change):
Employee Intensity + 0.035 3.53*** 0.058 1.94**
Asset Intensity ) )0.055 )5.43*** )0.154 )4.93***
Successive Decrease + 0.027 1.59* 0.046 0.88
Stock Performance ? )0.0001 )16.75*** 0.020 0.56
Standalone Variables:
Employee Intensity 0.008 7.45*** 0.010 3.78***
Asset Intensity 0.007 10.45*** )0.001 )0.27
Successive Decrease )0.049 )24.56*** )0.025 )6.06***
Stock Performance )0.001 )23.86*** )0.005 )1.84**
Year Dummies Suppressed
N 51,314 5,278
Adjusted R2 66.13% 65.79%
Note:
This table presents the regression results from (1). See Table 2 for variable deﬁnitions. The coefﬁ-
cient estimates are based on ﬁrm clustered standard errors (Petersen 2009). *, **, and *** denote
signiﬁcance at levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 using one-tailed tests, respectively.
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activities. The coefﬁcient on Successive Decrease is signiﬁcantly positive (0.027, t = 1.59)
in the base sample, suggesting a lower degree of SG&A cost asymmetry in ﬁrms experienc-
ing negative demand shocks in two consecutive years. The signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient
on Stock Performance ()0.0001, t = )16.75) in the base sample suggests that the degree
of SG&A cost asymmetry is higher in ﬁrms with strong stock performance. However,
unlike Anderson et al. 2003, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient on Employee Inten-
sity in both samples (0.035 and 0.058, respectively), suggesting a lower degree of SG&A
cost asymmetry in ﬁrms that require relatively more employees to support operations. We
conjecture that this inconsistency is due to the difference in the samples used in our study
and the Anderson et al. 2003 study.7
The agency problem and cost asymmetry
Hypotheses 1a through 1d predict that the severity of the agency problem is positively
associated with the degree of cost asymmetry after controlling for economic determinants.
Thus, the coefﬁcient for the interaction term b2 in (1) can be expressed as a function of
the agency problem as well as economic variables. We expand (1) to test Hypotheses 1a
through 1d with the following model:
logð SG & Ai;tSG & Ai;t1Þ ¼ b0 þ b1logð
Salesi;t
Salesi;t1
Þ þ b2DecDummy  logð Salesi;tSalesi;t1Þ
þ P
6
m¼3
bmDecDummy  logð Salesi;tSalesi;t1Þ  AgencyVarm;i;t
þ
X10
p¼7
bpDecDummy  logð
Salesi;t
Salesi;t1
Þ  EconVarp;i;t
þ
X14
q¼11
bqAgencyVarq;i;t þ
X18
s¼15
bsEconVars;i;tþei;t ð2Þ
where AgencyVar stands for the four agency variables: FCF, CEO Tenure, CEO Horizon, and
CEO Compensation (deﬁned in section 3 above) and EconVar stands for the four economic
determinants as control variables:Employee Intensity, Asset Intensity, Successive Performance,
and Stock Performance (deﬁned in section 3 above). Continuous variables used in the interac-
tion terms are mean-centered before they are included in the analysis to mitigate multicollin-
earity as well as to facilitate the interpretation of the main effects (Aiken andWest 1991).
As in (1), where the degree of cost asymmetry increases with the magnitude of the neg-
ative value of b2, the degree of cost asymmetry increases (decreases) with the magnitude of
the negative (positive) values of bm and bp in (2). Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 present the
results from estimating (2). The coefﬁcients and t-statistics reported are based on ﬁrm-clus-
tered standard errors, which address the heteroskedasticity and intraﬁrm error correlation
problems associated with panel data. Similar to the estimation results of (1), we ﬁnd that
ß1 is signiﬁcantly positive (ß1 = 0.770, t = 38.77). However, the inclusion of the agency
variables in (2) renders ß2 insigniﬁcant (ß2 = )0.062, t = )1.13),
8 suggesting that the
7. While the Anderson et al. (2003) sample covers the period from 1979 to 1998, our sample period is from
1995 to 2005. We conjecture that our sample ﬁrms, which come from more recent years, may use tempo-
rary labor to a greater extent, allowing them to have greater ﬂexibility with their labor costs. Because
laying workers off when demand decreases and hiring workers when demand increases should incur less
adjustment costs for temporary workers than for permanent workers, to the extent that ﬁrms with greater
labor intensity in our sample also employ a larger percentage of temporary workers, labor intensity can be
negatively associated with cost asymmetry.
8. In general, the degree of cost asymmetry is reduced in the restricted sample which excludes observations
where sales and SG&A costs move in opposite directions as compared to the full sample. In the full sam-
ple, ß2 is signiﬁcantly negative in (2) for all the analyses we present in Table 5 through Table 8.
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agency and economic variables subsume the effects of sales decreases on SG&A costs. The
coefﬁcients of the economic variable interaction terms are largely consistent with the esti-
mates from (1).
Hypothesis 1a predicts that the degree of SG&A cost asymmetry increases with free
cash ﬂow. A negative coefﬁcient on the FCF interaction term would indicate a greater
TABLE 5
Regressing annual changes in SG&A costs on annual changes in sales revenue and agency and eco-
nomic determinants of cost stickiness
FCF FCF Instrument Variable
Coefﬁcient t-stat Coefﬁcient t-stat
Intercept 0.017 3.55*** 0.019 3.76***
Sales Change + 0.770 38.77*** 0.767 38.40***
DecDummy*Sales Change ) )0.062 )1.13 )0.057 )1.04
Interaction Terms: (Variable*DecDummy*Sales Change)
Free Cash Flow ) )0.803 )3.50*** )1.096 )4.22***
Tenure ) )0.004 )1.63* )0.004 )1.52*
Horizon + 0.104 1.85** 0.097 1.71**
FixedPay + 0.155 2.04** 0.144 1.91**
Employee Intensity + 0.045 1.52* 0.040 1.33*
Asset Intensity ) )0.115 )3.68*** )0.126 )4.02***
Successive Decrease + 0.014 0.28 0.044 0.88
Stock Performance ? 0.028 0.76 0.023 0.64
Standalone Variables:
Free Cash Flow 0.121 5.81*** 0.112 4.73***
Tenure 0.0002 1.38* 0.000 1.46*
Horizon 0.003 0.76 0.002 0.65
FixedPay 0.002 0.35 0.001 0.18
Employee Intensity 0.009 3.45*** 0.009 3.64***
Asset Intensity 0.001 0.30 0.001 0.19
Successive Decrease )0.023 )5.48*** )0.023 )5.58***
Stock Performance )0.007 )2.48*** )0.006 )2.23**
Year Dummies Suppressed
N 5,278 5,278
Adjusted R2 66.54% 66.44%
Note:
This table presents the regression results from (2). See Table 2 for variable deﬁnitions. The coefﬁ-
cient estimates are based on ﬁrm clustered standard errors (Petersen 2009). *, **, and *** denote
signiﬁcance at levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 using two-tailed tests, respectively.
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degree of cost asymmetry, so we expect the coefﬁcient on the FCF interaction term to be
negative. As shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, the result is consistent with Hypothesis
1a. The coefﬁcient on the FCF interaction term is signiﬁcantly negative at the 1 percent
level with a one-tailed test (coefﬁcient = )0.803, t = )3.50), suggesting that SG&A cost
asymmetry increases when FCF is higher. The effect of FCF on cost stickiness is in addi-
tion to a signiﬁcantly positive main effect of FCF (coefﬁcient = 0.121, t = 5.81) on
SG&A cost changes.
Hypothesis 1b predicts that the degree of SG&A cost asymmetry increases with
CEO tenure. A negative coefﬁcient on the Tenure interaction term would indicate a
greater degree of cost asymmetry, so we expect the coefﬁcient on the Tenure interaction
term to be negative. As shown in Table 5, the result is consistent with Hypothesis 1b.
The coefﬁcient on the Tenure interaction term is signiﬁcantly negative at the 10 percent
level with a one-tailed test (coefﬁcient = )0.004, t = )1.63), indicating that SG&A
cost asymmetry is greater when the CEO has been in ofﬁce for a longer period of
time.
Hypothesis 1c predicts that the degree of SG&A cost asymmetry decreases in the year
of CEO change or the year immediately preceding a CEO change. Since a positive coefﬁ-
cient on the Horizon (an indicator variable that equals 1 in a year of CEO change or a
year immediately preceding a CEO change) interaction term would indicate a lower degree
of cost asymmetry, we expect the coefﬁcient on the Horizon interaction term to be posi-
tive. The result reported in Table 5 supports Hypothesis 1c. The coefﬁcient on the Horizon
interaction term is signiﬁcantly positive at the 5 percent level with a one-tailed test (coefﬁ-
cient = 0.104, t = 1.85). This result indicates that SG&A cost asymmetry is reduced when
the CEO expects to leave within a short period of time.
Hypothesis 1d predicts that the degree of SG&A cost asymmetry decreases with the
percentage of ﬁxed pay in a CEO’s total compensation. Since a positive coefﬁcient on the
FixedPay interaction term would indicate a lower degree of cost asymmetry, we expect the
coefﬁcient on the FixedPay interaction term to be positive. The result in Table 5 supports
Hypothesis 1d. The coefﬁcient on the FixedPay interaction term is signiﬁcantly positive at
the 5 percent level with a one-tailed test (coefﬁcient = 0.155, t = 2.04), indicating that
SG&A cost asymmetry is lower when ﬁxed pay accounts for a larger percentage of a
CEO’s total compensation.9
An important limitation of the estimation of (2) concerns the endogeneity of FCF. We
assume that FCF is exogenous in the estimation of (2), but prior literature suggests that
FCF can be determined by variables such as ﬁrm size, leverage, and investment oppor-
tunity (Jensen 1986). To alleviate the endogeneity concern, we ﬁrst regress FCF on the
second moment of FCF and then use the resulting predicted value of FCF in (2) (Lewbel
1997; Banker et al. 2011). Our results are robust to this alternative measure of FCF.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 present the estimation of (2) using the instrumental variable
9. A potential endogeneity concern is that CEO compensation structure may be affected by the strength of
corporate governance. For example, Cheng and Indjejikian (2009) ﬁnd that CEO compensation is more
sensitive to performance following the enactment of anti-takeover laws. Given the substitute effects
between external governance mechanisms and internal incentives, a potential alternative explanation for
our results is that a higher percentage of ﬁxed income could be the result of strong corporate governance,
and therefore the negative association between the percentage of ﬁxed income and SG&A cost stickiness
could be attributed to better corporate governance. To investigate this alternative explanation, we regress
FixedPay on our two corporate governance factors and use the residual from the regression as an instru-
mental variable to replace the raw variable FixedPay in the estimation of (2). Our results are robust to this
instrumental variable. Speciﬁcally, all the agency variables have signiﬁcant coefﬁcients in predicted direc-
tions. The coefﬁcients and t-values are as follows: FCF ()0.795, t = 3.46), Horizon ()0.103, t = 1.83),
Tenure ()0.004, t = )1.61) and FixedPay (0.157, t = 2.06).
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for FCF.10 An alternative instrumental variable approach is to use industry average FCF
(Lev and Sougiannis 1996).11 Untabulated results indicate that our results are also robust
to this alternative instrumental variable for FCF. To sum up, the results reported in
Table 5 provide strong support for our argument that the agency problem complements
known economic factors in explaining SG&A cost asymmetry.
The effect of corporate governance in mitigating the agency problem
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the positive association between the agency problem and
SG&A costs is less pronounced in ﬁrms with stronger corporate governance. As we men-
tioned above, we ﬁrst conduct principal component analysis to reduce the dimensionality
of our governance variables and then we test the hypothesis. This analysis yields two fac-
tors which have eigenvalues greater than 1.1 and account for more than half of the sample
variance. Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of the principal component factor
analysis with Varimax rotation. The variables that load on the ﬁrst factor include BCF
Anti-takeover Index and Staggered Board, so we label the ﬁrst factor Takeover Threat. The
variables that load on the second factor include Percentage of Independent Directors and
Percentage of Institutional Ownership. We label the second factor Other Governance
Variables. Board Size and CEO ⁄Chairman Separation do not load signiﬁcantly on either of
the factors. We use factor loadings to construct weighted factor scores for these two
corporate governance dimensions and employ them in the tests of Hypothesis 2. A lower
score on the Takeover Threat factor indicates stronger corporate governance because fewer
anti-takeover provisions increase the disciplining role of takeover markets. A higher score
on the Other Governance Variables factor indicates stronger corporate governance because
a larger percentage of institutional shareholders and a larger percentage of independent
directors strengthen the monitoring of managers’ behavior.
To test Hypothesis 2, we partition our sample into Strong versus Weak Governance
subsamples, using the median value of each governance factor to split the sample. We
estimate (2) for each subsample and compare the coefﬁcients on the agency variable
interaction terms DecDummy* Sales Change * AgencyVar (b3 through b6) in (2) between
the Strong and Weak Governance subsamples.12 To support Hypothesis 2, coefﬁcients b3
through b6 should be more pronounced in the Weak Governance subsample than in the
Strong Governance subsample.
Columns 2 to 5 in panel B of Table 6 present the results for our subsample tests based
on the ﬁrst corporate governance factor: Takeover Threat. For all four agency variables,
we ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects in the predicted direction in the Weak Governance subsample,
but insigniﬁcant effects in the Strong Governance subsample, indicating that takeover
threats are effective in curtailing the agency problem in SG&A cost decisions. Speciﬁcally,
in the Weak Governance subsample, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on FCF
()1.539, t = )3.80), a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on Tenure ()0.009, t = )2.78), a
signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient on Horizon (0.162, t = 1.98), and a signiﬁcantly positive
coefﬁcient on FixedPay (0.301, t = 2.05). By contrast, in the Strong Governance subsam-
ple, we ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant for none of the four agency variable interac-
tion terms. These results suggest that a combination of weak governance (i.e., when
managers are protected by more anti-takeover provisions) and the agency problem leads
10. For the remaining tests (results summarized in Tables 6 through 8), we ﬁnd qualitatively similar results
using raw FCF variable or FCF instrumental variable. We report regression results using raw FCF vari-
able in our paper, but the results using FCF instrumental variable are available upon request.
11. See Banker et al. 2011 for a discussion of these two instrumental variable approaches.
12. We made this research design choice because the alternative research design would involve four-way inter-
action terms (Decrease dummy * Sales change * AgencyVar * Governance), which would make the coefﬁ-
cients difﬁcult to interpret.
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managers to delay the cutting of SG&A costs when revenue decreases. However, under
strong governance (when managers are protected by fewer anti-takeover provisions), the
agency problem is not the primary driver of SG&A cost stickiness.
Columns 6 to 9 of Table 6, panel B present the results for the subsample tests based
on the second corporate governance factor: Other Governance Variables (mainly driven by
percentage of independent directors and percentage of institutional shareholders). Again,
for all four agency variables, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects in the predicted direction in the
Weak Governance subsample. Speciﬁcally, in the Weak Governance subsample, we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on FCF ()0.961, t = )3.25), a signiﬁcantly negative coef-
ﬁcient on Tenure ()0.005, t = )1.33), a signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient on Horizon (0.133,
t = 1.75), and a signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient on FixedPay (0.230, t = 2.31). By con-
trast, in the Strong Governance subsample, we only ﬁnd signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on two out
of the four agency variables, that is, a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on FCF ()0.687,
t = )1.76), and a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on Tenure ()0.005, t = )1.62). We ﬁnd
insigniﬁcant effects on SG&A cost stickiness for Horizon and FixedPay. We interpret these
results as suggesting that the association between SG&A cost stickiness and the agency
problem is also mitigated by the second governance factor.
Taken together, the results in Table 6 provide support for Hypothesis 2, indicating
that corporate governance mechanisms such as takeover threats, institutional shareholders,
and board independence are effective in reducing the impact of the agency problem on
SG&A cost asymmetry.13
Additional analyses
We conduct additional analyses to provide further support for the agency argument. First,
we conduct an analysis to provide more direct evidence on whether the agency problem
shifts SG&A cost asymmetry from its optimal level. Building on Banker et al.’s 2011
results of the cross-sectional variations in the long-term value created by SG&A expendi-
tures, we predict that the extent to which the agency problem affects managers’ SG&A
cost decisions depends on the varying future value creation potential of SG&A costs
across ﬁrms. As Banker et al. (2011: 8) argue, ‘‘[m]yopic behavior is unlikely to dominate
where incremental long-term investments can generate sufﬁciently high future value to out-
weigh the short-term beneﬁts from myopic behavior.’’ Thus, we predict that when SG&A
costs create greater future value, SG&A cost stickiness should be inﬂuenced more by eco-
nomic considerations than by agency considerations. We test this prediction by partition-
ing our sample based on the industry-speciﬁc impact of lagged SG&A on return on assets
documented in Table 2 of Banker et al. 2011 and comparing the coefﬁcients on the agency
variable interaction terms across the two subsamples. The results are shown in Table 7.
We ﬁnd that ß2 is signiﬁcantly negative in the High Value Creation subsample but is insig-
niﬁcant in the Low Value Creation subsample. This is consistent with managers trading
off the potential costs from reduced proﬁt against the potential beneﬁts from higher com-
pensation associated with size when they consider delaying the cutting of SG&A costs.
When SG&A costs create high future value, cutting too much SG&A costs in the short
13. Recent research suggests that corporate governance can be endogenous (Dey 2008). We address the corpo-
rate governance endogeneity issue by regressing the two corporate governance factors on well-documented
determinants of corporate governance variables and then using the residuals from the regressions as instru-
mental variables in our subsample tests of the effect of the agency problem on SG&A cost stickiness. Spe-
ciﬁcally, we regress our two corporate governance factors on the following determinants: Firm Size
(measured by the natural logarithm of sales), Growth (captured by the standard deviation of sales revenue
over the ﬁve years prior to the event year divided by the mean of sales revenue over the ﬁve years prior to
the event year), Leverage (measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total assets), FCF, and Future Value
Created by SG&A Costs. Our results are robust.
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term would potentially lead to lower performance in the long term. On the other hand,
when SG&A costs create low future value, delaying the cutting of SG&A costs in the
short term would lead to wasteful expenditures on SG&A costs and potentially lower
TABLE 7
SG&A cost asymmetry for subsamples with different SG&A future value creation
High value creation (Future
Value >= median)
Low value creation (Future
Value < median)
Coefﬁcient t-stat Coefﬁcient t-stat
Intercept 0.011 1.63* 0.022 3.18***
Sales Change 0.837 35.76*** 0.725 23.90***
DecDummy*Sales Change )0.210 )2.61*** 0.032 0.46
Interaction Terms: (Variable*DecDummy*Sales Change)
Free Cash Flow )0.796 )2.58*** )0.771 )2.22**
Tenure )0.006 )1.54* )0.004 )1.43*
Horizon 0.017 0.21 0.225 2.63***
FixedPay 0.040 0.36 0.242 2.01**
Employee Intensity 0.056 2.12** 0.006 0.11
Asset Intensity )0.130 )3.62*** )0.110 )2.12**
Successive Decrease 0.160 1.89** )0.075 )1.17
Stock Performance )0.019 )0.41 0.082 1.93**
Standalone Variables:
Free Cash Flow 0.074 3.29*** 0.182 4.63***
Tenure )0.0001 )0.23 0.001 1.76**
Horizon 0.001 0.28 0.004 0.70
FixedPay 0.002 0.36 0.006 0.68
Employee Intensity 0.007 2.65*** 0.014 3.08***
Asset Intensity )0.003 )0.92 0.008 1.34*
Successive Decrease )0.025 )4.11*** )0.017 )2.81***
Stock Performance )0.012 )3.52*** 0.002 0.39
Year Dummies Suppressed
N 2,594 2,528
Adjusted R2 70.72% 63.90%
Note:
This table presents the regression results from the following regression model. The sample is parti-
tioned into two subsamples based on the future value creation of SG&A costs (FutureValue)
documented in Banker et al. 2011. See Table 2 for variable deﬁnitions. The coefﬁcient estimates
are based on ﬁrm clustered standard errors (Petersen 2009). *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at
levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 using two-tailed tests, respectively.
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performance in the long term. Therefore, when SG&A costs create higher future value,
managers should be more likely to delay the cutting of SG&A costs, leading to greater
cost stickiness; conversely, when SG&A costs create lower future value, managers are
more likely to cut SG&A costs, leading to lower cost stickiness.
More importantly, in addition to the main effect of SG&A value creation potential on
cost stickiness, we ﬁnd that, as predicted, the agency problem inﬂuences cost stickiness to
a greater extent in ﬁrms where SG&A costs create lower long-term value compared to
ﬁrms where SG&A costs create higher long-term value. Speciﬁcally, for all four agency
variables, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects in the predicted direction in the Low Value Creation
subsample: a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on FCF ()0.771, t = )2.22), a signiﬁcantly
negative coefﬁcient on Tenure ()0.004, t = )1.43), a signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient on
Horizon (0.225, t = 2.63), and a signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient on FixedPay (0.242,
t = 2.01). By contrast, in the High Value Creation subsample, we only ﬁnd signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients on two out of the four agency variables, i.e., a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient
on FCF ()0.796, t = )2.58), and a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on Tenure ()0.006,
t = )1.54). We ﬁnd insigniﬁcant effects on SG&A cost stickiness for Horizon and Fixed-
Pay. These results suggest that, even though the low value creation potential of SG&A
costs induces an overall lower degree of cost stickiness, managers with severe agency prob-
lems still delay the cutting of SG&A costs, resulting in greater cost stickiness than dictated
by economic considerations. Under the assumption that future ﬁrm value will decline in
those ﬁrms where managers retain SG&A costs due to the agency problem even though
SG&A costs do not create high future value, we interpret these results as providing
indirect evidence that shareholders incur costs in those ﬁrms where the agency problem
shifts cost asymmetry from its optimal level. Consistent with this, we ﬁnd that ROE in
year t + 1 is signiﬁcantly lower (t = 1.99) for the Low Value Creation subsample
(ROE = 0.110) than for the High Value Creation subsample (ROE = 0.120) even though
ROEs in year t)1 and year t are not signiﬁcantly different between the two subsamples.
This result provides more direct evidence that shareholders incur costs in those ﬁrms where
the agency problem shifts cost asymmetry from its optimal level.
Second, if the empirical results documented in our main tests are driven by the agency
problem, the effects should be more pronounced in mature ﬁrms than in growth ﬁrms
because SG&A costs capture more slack resources in mature ﬁrms than in growth ﬁrms.
To test this conjecture, we partition our sample based on the life-cycle stage of each ﬁrm
year, measured as the standard deviation of sales revenue over the ﬁve years prior to the
event year divided by the mean of sales revenue over the ﬁve years prior to the event year
(Banker et al. 2011) and compare the coefﬁcients on the agency variable interaction terms
across the two subsamples.14 Table 8, Panel A summarizes the results. We ﬁnd that ß2 is
signiﬁcantly negative in growth ﬁrms only, suggesting that cost stickiness is much more
pronounced in growth ﬁrms than in mature ﬁrms. Consistent with our prediction, we ﬁnd
that the agency problem inﬂuences cost stickiness to a greater extent in mature ﬁrms than
in growth ﬁrms. For all four agency variables, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects in the predicted
direction in the Mature Firms subsample: a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on FCF
()1.067, t = )2.77), a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on Tenure ()0.009, t = )2.61), a
signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient on Horizon (0.209, t = 2.60), and a signiﬁcantly positive
coefﬁcient on FixedPay (0.341, t = 2.67). However, in the Growth Firms subsample,
we only ﬁnd signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on two out of the four agency variables, that is, a
14. We get similar results when we use Tobin’s Q (calculated as total assets (data item 6) plus market value
(data item 199 * data item 25) minus common equity (data item 60) – deferred taxes (data item 74)
divided by total assets (data item 6)) (Chen, Chen, and Wei 2011) to partition our sample into growth ver-
sus mature ﬁrms.
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TABLE 8
SG&A cost asymmetry for growth ﬁrms vs. mature ﬁrms
Panel A: Regression analysis
Growth ﬁrms
(StdDevSale >= median)
Mature ﬁrms
(StdDevSale < median)
Coefﬁcient t-stat Coefﬁcient t-stat
Intercept 0.011 1.21 0.022 3.68***
Sales Change 0.808 32.63*** 0.719 23.34***
DecDummy*Sales Change )0.154 )2.08** 0.117 1.58
Interaction Terms: (Variable*DecDummy*Sales Change)
Free Cash Flow )0.741 )2.74*** )1.067 )2.77***
Tenure )0.005 )1.57* )0.009 )2.61***
Horizon 0.017 0.23 0.209 2.60***
FixedPay 0.041 0.49 0.341 2.67***
Employee Intensity 0.078 3.15*** )0.002 )0.04
Asset Intensity )0.202 )4.97*** )0.020 )0.35
Successive Decrease 0.045 0.68 )0.019 )0.26
Stock Performance 0.012 0.33 0.117 2.29***
Standalone Variables:
Free Cash Flow 0.092 3.64*** 0.129 4.08***
Tenure 0.0002 0.78 0.0001 0.05
Horizon 0.004 0.82 0.001 0.26
FixedPay 0.002 0.22 0.010 1.28
Employee Intensity 0.010 3.19*** 0.008 2.06**
Asset Intensity 0.001 0.15 0.010 2.08**
Successive Decrease )0.027 )3.68*** )0.016 )3.14***
Stock Performance )0.005 )1.60* )0.010 )2.22**
Year Dummies Suppressed
N 2,555 2,555
Adjusted R2 69.63% 64.63%
Panel B: Characteristics of subsamples
Growth ﬁrms
(StdDevSale >= median)
Mature ﬁrms
(StdDevSale < median)
N Mean Median StdDev N Mean Median StdDev
High value
creation
(FutureValue
>= median)
FutureValue 1,483 1.019 0.645 0.545 1,093 0.821 0.645 0.456
StdDevSales 0.488 0.374 0.358 0.111 0.111 0.047
Low value
creation
(FutureValue
< median)
FutureValue 1,070 0.283 0.285 0.110 1,458 0.258 0.285 0.124
StdDevSale 0.399 0.315 0.244 0.108 0.107 0.047
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on FCF ()0.741, t = )2.74), and a signiﬁcantly negative
coefﬁcient on Tenure ()0.005, t = )1.57). We ﬁnd insigniﬁcant effects on SG&A cost
stickiness for Horizon and FixedPay. These results support our prediction that SG&A cost
stickiness is driven by the agency problem to a larger extent in mature ﬁrms than in
growth ﬁrms. Even though SG&A cost stickiness is substantially reduced in mature ﬁrms,
managers with severe agency problems still delay the cutting of SG&A costs, resulting in
greater cost stickiness than mandated by economic factors.
If there is a positive correlation between the long-term value created by SG&A costs
and the growth prospects of a company, it is possible that the results from the above two
additional analyses are driven by the same set of ﬁrms. To better understand this issue, we
examine the distribution of ﬁrm-year observations for these two dimensions. As shown in
panel B of Table 8, growth ﬁrms and mature ﬁrms are approximately evenly distributed
across the High Value Creation and Low Value Creation subsamples, indicating that these
two dimensions are orthogonal to each other and therefore our two additional analyses do
not reﬂect the same phenomenon.
By showing that the cross-sectional variation in the effect of agency factors on SG&A
cost stickiness is consistent with theoretical predictions, the above additional tests help
alleviate the concern that our results are driven by omitted variables and provide further
support for our hypothesis that the agency problem inﬂuences the degree of cost asymmetry.
Robustness checks
We assess the sensitivity of our results in the following ways.
First, we use two alternative denominators for our measure of FCF (book value of
equity and the sum of book value of equity and book value of long-term debt). We also
calculate an alternative measure of FCF to account for investment activities: operating
cash ﬂow (data item 308) plus cash receipts from sales of property, plant, and equipment
(data item 107) minus capital expenditure and acquisition expenditure (data items 128 and
129) scaled by total assets (Richardson 2006). Our results are robust to these alternative
measures of FCF.
TABLE 8 (Continued)
Note:
This table presents the regression results from the following regression model. The sample is parti-
tioned into mature ﬁrms and growth ﬁrms based on the life-cycle stage of each ﬁrm year, mea-
sured as the standard deviation of sales revenue over the ﬁve years prior to the event year
divided by the mean of sales revenue over the ﬁve years prior to the event year (Banker et al.
2011). Panel A shows the regression results and panel B provides sample characteristics. See
Table 2 for variable deﬁnitions. The coefﬁcient estimates are based on ﬁrm clustered standard
errors (Petersen 2009). *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respec-
tively, using two-tailed tests.
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Second, the previous literature documents that R&D and advertising expenses repre-
sent value-enhancing investments and thus have positive impact upon future operating
income (e.g., Lev and Sougiannis 1996). As a result, R&D and advertising expenses may
behave differently than the other components of SG&A costs. We repeated our analyses
after excluding R&D and advertising from total SG&A costs.15 This alternative measure
of SG&A costs did not change our results.
Third, we examine an alternative measure of CEO compensation, pay-for-performance
sensitivity. We do not make a directional prediction on the effect of pay-for-performance
sensitivity on SG&A cost stickiness because, on the one hand, pay-for-performance sensi-
tivity may help align the interests of managers with the interests of shareholders and thus
reduce the agency problem in general; but, on the other hand, a higher proportion of at-
risk pay encourages managers’ empire building behavior (Kanniainen 2000). We follow
Core and Guay’s 2002 methodology in measuring pay-for-performance sensitivity, which
is calculated as the sensitivity of the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio as of the end of
year t)1 to a 1 percent change in stock price minus the sensitivity of the value of the
CEO’s equity portfolio as of the end of year t)2 to a 1 percent change in stock price
deﬂated by average total assets. We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of pay-for-performance
on SG&A cost stickiness. Including this alternative measure of CEO compensation does
not affect our other results.
In addition, we control for potential industry effects in our regressions by adding 48
industry dummies based on Fama-French industry classiﬁcation (Fama and French 1997).
Our results are unaffected by the inclusion of these dummies. Furthermore, ﬁrms with
merger and acquisition (M&A) activities in year t may inherit sales and SG&A costs from
the ﬁrms that they acquire or merge with, creating noise for our analysis. Excluding ﬁrm-
years with M&A activities did not change our results.
Finally, in the sample selection, we followed Anderson and Lanen’s 2007 suggestion
and excluded observations where SG&A costs move in the opposite direction of sales in
both the base sample and the testing sample. As a robustness check, we estimated our
models without excluding these observations. Our results do not change, although the
magnitude of cost stickiness is greater in the sample that included these observations than
in the sample that excluded these observations.16 This is consistent with Banker et al.
2010, whose simulation tests show that excluding these observations biases the coefﬁcient
ß2 downward.
5. Conclusion
In this study we examine whether agency factors drive SG&A cost behavior in addition to
economic factors. Based on the empire building and the downsizing literatures, we predict a
signiﬁcant association between the agency problem and cost asymmetry. In addition, we
expect corporate governance to reduce the agency problem and therefore predict that corpo-
rate governance mitigates the positive association between the agency problem and cost
asymmetry. Our ﬁndings are consistent with these predictions. We ﬁnd strong evidence that
cost asymmetry is positively associated with managers’ empire building incentives due to the
agency problem, as measured by FCF, CEO horizon, tenure, and compensation structure.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the positive association between the agency problem and SG&A cost
asymmetry is more pronounced under weak corporate governance, suggesting that corpo-
rate governance mechanisms play an important role in mitigating the effect of the agency
problem on managers’ cost adjustment decisions in response to exogenous shocks to
15. We assume that R&D and ⁄ or advertising costs are zero for those ﬁrms that do not disclose R&D and ⁄ or
advertising costs separately.
16. Results are available upon request.
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demand. Finally, we provide preliminary but more direct evidence that the agency problem
shifts SG&A costs stickiness from its optimal level dictated by economic factors.
Our study extends the prior literature on SG&A cost stickiness by providing the ﬁrst
large-sample empirical evidence for an additional explanation for the SG&A cost asymme-
try phenomenon from the agency perspective. By documenting the effects of agency fac-
tors on cost asymmetry, our study sheds light on the role that managers play in adjusting
costs in response to exogenous shocks to output demand. In addition, our study contrib-
utes to the FCF literature as well as to a growing literature that examines the impact of
the agency problem on managers’ speciﬁc business decisions and the effectiveness of
corporate governance in mitigating the agency problem.
Results of our study should be interpreted with the following caveats in mind. First,
although we have controlled for known economic determinants in the prior literature, it is
possible that we have not controlled for all possible economic determinants and our
agency factors may not be perfect proxies for the agency problem. However, in the
absence of theory, there is little guidance as to additional economic determinants we
should include in the SG&A cost stickiness model. Second, even though cost stickiness is a
robust phenomenon in our sample, the degree of cost stickiness is substantially reduced
once we follow Anderson and Lanen’s 2007 suggestion and remove observations where
sales and SG&A costs move in opposite directions. With these caveats in mind, we believe
that ﬁndings of our study support agency conﬂicts as an important explanation for SG&A
cost behavior and also support the importance of corporate governance in mitigating the
inﬂuence of the agency problem on managers’ cost adjustment decisions.
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